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1Prospect and Markowitz Stochastic Dominance
Abstract
Levy and Levy (2002, 2004) develop the Prospect and Markowitz stochastic dominance
theory with S-shaped and reverse S-shaped utility functions for investors. In this paper,
we extend Levy and Levy’s Prospect Stochastic Dominance theory (PSD) and Markowitz
Stochastic Dominance theory (MSD) to the ﬁrst three orders and link the corresponding
S-shaped and reverse S-shaped utility functions to the ﬁrst three orders. We also provide
experiments to illustrate each case of the MSD and PSD to the ﬁrst three orders and
demonstrate that the higher order MSD and PSD cannot be replaced by the lower order
MSD and PSD.
Prospect theory has been regarded as a challenge to the expected utility paradigm. Levy
and Levy (2002) prove that the second order PSD and MSD satisfy the expected utility
paradigm. In our paper we take Levy and Levy’s results one step further by showing
that both PSD and MSD of any order are consistent with the expected utility paradigm.
Furthermore, we formulate some other properties for the PSD and MSD including the
hierarchy that exists in both PSD and MSD relationships; arbitrage opportunities that
exist in the ﬁrst orders of both PSD and MSD; and that for any two prospects under
certain conditions, their third order MSD preference will be ‘the opposite’ of or ‘the same’
as their counterpart third order PSD preference. By extending Levy and Levy’s work, we
provide investors with more tools for empirical analysis, with which they can identify the
ﬁrst order PSD and MSD prospects and discern arbitrage opportunities that could increase
his/her utility as well as wealth and set up a zero dollar portfolio to make huge proﬁt. Our
tools also enable investors to identify the third order PSD and MSD prospects and make
better choices.
Keywords: Prospect stochastic dominance, Markowitz stochastic dominance, risk
seeking, risk averse, S-shaped utility function, reverse S-shaped utility function
21 Introduction
Economic analyses of decisions made by diﬀerent kinds of investors under uncertainty can
be graphically presented by functions. According to the von Neuman and Morgenstern
(1944) expected utility theory, the functions for risk averters and risk seekers are concave
and convex respectively, and both are increasing functions. There has been great interest
in the relationships between the utility functions and the stochastic dominance (SD) theory
in theory and applications. Early theoretical works linking the SD theory to the selection
rules for risk averters under diﬀerent restrictions on the utility functions include Quirk
and Saposnik (1962), Fishburn (1964, 1974), Hanoch and Levy (1969), Whitmore (1970),
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1971), Hammond (1974), Tesfatsion (1976), Meyer (1977)
and Vickson (1977). Linking the SD theory to the selection rules for risk seekers has also
been well investigated, see for example, Hammond (1974), Meyer (1977), Stoyan (1983),
Levy and Wiener (1998), Wong and Li (1999), Li and Wong (1999) and Anderson (2004).
Examining the relative attractiveness of various forms of investments, Friedman and
Savage (1948) claim that the strictly concave functions may not be able to explain the
behavior why investors buy insurance or lottery tickets. Markowitz (1952), the ﬁrst to
address Friedman and Savage’s concern, proposes a utility function which has convex and
concave regions in both the positive and the negative domains1. To support Markowitz’s
utility function, Williams (1966) reports data where a translation of outcomes produces a
dramatic shift from risk aversion to risk seeking while Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979)
document the prevalence of risk seeking in choices between negative prospects. Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) claim that the (value) utility
function2 is concave for gains and convex for losses, yielding an S-shaped function. They
also develop a formal theory of loss aversion called prospect theory in which investors can
maximize the expectation of the S-shaped utility function. It is one of the most popular
theories of decision made under risk and has gained much attention from economists and
professionals in the ﬁnancial sector.
Thereafter, a stream of papers building economic or ﬁnancial models on the prospect
1Ng (1965) also provides another explanation to Friedman and Savage’s paradox.
2Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) call it value function while, for
simplicity, we call it utility function. There will be more discussion in Section 3.
3theory has been written, for example, Thaler (1985), Shefrin and Statman (1993), Benartzi
and Thaler (1995), Levy and Wiener (1998), Barberis et al. (2001) and Levy and Levy
(2002, 2004). There have also been many empirical and experimental attempts to test the
prospect theory, for example, the equity premium puzzle by Benartzi and Thaler (1995);
asymmetric price elasticities by Hardie et al. (1993); downward-sloping labor supply by
Dunn (1996) and Camerer et al. (1997); and the buying strategies of hog farmers by
Pennings and Smidts (2003). Most of these studies support the prospect theory. The
prospect theory has also been widely applied in Economics and Finance, see for example,
Thaler et al. (1997), Myagkov and Plott (1997), Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) and
Levy and Levy (2004).
Noticing the presence of risk seeking in preferences among positive as well as negative
prospects, Markowitz (1952) proposes another type of utility functions diﬀerent from the
pure S-shaped utility functions used in the prospect theory. He suggests a utility which
is ﬁrst concave, then convex, then concave, and ﬁnally convex to modify the explanation
provided by Friedman and Savage why investors buy insurance and buy lotteries tickets.
Levy and Wiener (1998) and Levy and Levy (2002, 2004) study the portion of the utility
from concave to convex which yields reverse S-shaped utility functions for investors. The
study shows that individuals are risk averse to losses and risk seeking for gains. Levy and
Levy (2002) further extend the work of Markowitz (1952), Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and are the ﬁrst to develop a new criterion called
Markowitz Stochastic Dominance (MSD) to determine the dominance of one investment
alternative over another for all reverse S-shaped functions, and another criterion called
Prospect Stochastic Dominance (PSD) to determine the dominance of one investment
alternative over another for all prospect theory S-shaped utility functions.
Working along similar lines as Whitmore (1970) who extends the second order SD
developed by Quirk and Saposnik (1962) and others to the third order SD for risk averters,
in this paper, we take the PSD and MSD developed by Levy and Wiener (1998) and Levy
and Levy (2002, 2004) further to study the PSD and MSD theories of the ﬁrst three orders
and link the extended PSD and MSD to the corresponding S-shaped and reverse S-shaped
utility functions of the ﬁrst three orders. We modify the examples used in Levy and Levy
to illustrate each case of the extended PSD and MSD of the ﬁrst three orders and show
that the higher order MSD and PSD cannot be replaced by the lower order MSD and PSD.
4It is noted that the MSD and PSD developed by Levy and Levy are equivalent respectively
to the second order MSD and PSD developed in this paper.
Many studies, for example, Swalm (1966), Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Kahneman
et al. (1990), and Barberis et al. (2001) suggest that the prospect theory violates the
expected utility theory as the convexity of the value function on the positive domain is
diﬀerent from that on the negative domain. Rabin (2000) also points out that the expected
utility cannot explain loss aversion which accounts for the modest-scale risk aversion for
both large and small stakes typically observed in empirical studies. To circumvent this
problem, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest employing the certainty equivalent ap-
proach to study the negative and the positive domains separately. However, studying the
positive and negative domains separately is a toil. Also, it is well known that in some cases
the certainty eﬀect may strongly aﬀect choices (see, for example, Allais 1953, and Tversky
and Kahneman 1981). Besides, the certainty equivalent approach does not show whether
the subject’s choices indicate an S-shaped function. The PSD and MSD developed in Levy
and Wiener (1998) and Levy and Levy (2002, 2004) bypass the above problems. Moreover,
they show that the prospect theory does not violate the expected utility theory as both
MSD and PSD satisfy the expected utility paradigm. Following Levy and Levy, this article
examines the compatibility of both the extended MSD and PSD with the expected utility
theory and proves that both MSD and PSD of any order are consistent with the expected
utility paradigm. In addition, we develop some other properties for the extended MSD and
PSD.
To summarize, this paper makes ﬁve contributions to the existing literature. This
paper is the ﬁrst to develop the MSD and PSD to the ﬁrst three orders. Second, we link
the extended PSD and MSD to their corresponding S-shaped and reverse S-shaped utility
functions to the ﬁrst three orders. Third, we show that both MSD and PSD satisfy the
expected utility paradigm and hence loss aversion does not violate the expected utility
paradigm. Fourth, we provide experiments to illustrate each case of the MSD and PSD
to the ﬁrst three orders and demonstrate that the higher order MSD and PSD cannot be
replaced by the lower order MSD and PSD. Finally, the paper develops some properties for
the extended MSD and PSD, including the hierarchy that exists in both PSD and MSD;
arbitrage opportunities that exist for the ﬁrst orders of both PSD and MSD; and that for
any two prospects under certain conditions, their third order MSD preference will be ‘the
5opposite’ of or ‘the same’ as their third order counterpart PSD preference. In terms of
empirical analysis, our approach is superior to Levy and Levy’s as our approach enables
investors to identify the MSD and PSD prospects to the ﬁrst three orders while Levy and
Levy’s only allows them to identify the MSD and PSD to the second order. Hence, our
approach enables investors to make wiser decisions with their investments. For example,
adopting our approach an investor can identify the ﬁrst order PSD and MSD prospects.
When the ﬁrst order PSD or MSD prospects are identiﬁed, the arbitrage opportunities are
revealed, and the investor can increase his or her utility as well as wealth to make huge
proﬁt by setting up a zero dollar portfolio from these ﬁrst order prospects. In addition, our
approach allows investors to identify the third order PSD and MSD prospects from which
the third order MSD and PSD investors3 could make wiser choices about these prospects.
However, Levy and Levy’s approach would not enable them to do so.
We begin by introducing deﬁnitions and notations in Section 2. Section 3 develops
several theorems and properties for the extended MSD and PSD. Section 4 provides illus-
trations for MSD and PSD to the ﬁrst three orders and demonstrates that the higher order
MSD and PSD cannot be replaced by the lower order MSD and PSD. Section 5 summarizes
our conclusions.
2 Deﬁnitions and Notations
Let R be the set of real numbers and R be the set of extended real numbers. Ω = [a,b]i s
a subset of R in which a<0 and b>0 and they can be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. Let B be the
Borel σ-ﬁeld of Ω and µ be a measure on (Ω,B). We ﬁrst deﬁne the functions F and F D
of the measure µ on the support Ω as
F(x)=µ[a,x] and F
D(x)=µ[x,b] for all x ∈ Ω . (1)
Function F is a probability distribution function and µ is a probability measure if µ(Ω) = 1.
In this paper, the deﬁnition of F is slightly diﬀerent from the ‘traditional’ deﬁnition of a
3Refer to Section 3 for the deﬁnitions of the third order MSD and PSD investors.
6distribution function. We follow the basic probability theory that for any random variable
X and for any probability measure P, there exists a unique induced probability measure
µ on (Ω,B) and a probability distribution function F such that F satisﬁes (1) and
µ(B)=P(X
−1(B)) = P(X ∈ B) for any B ∈ B .




A f(t)dF(t) is a Lebesgue integral for
any integrable function f(t). If the integral has the same value for any set A which is
equal to (c,d], [c,d)o r[ c,d], then we use the notation
R d
c f(t)dµ(t) instead. In addition,
if µ is a Borel measure with µ(c,d]=d − c for any c<d , then we write the integral as
R d
c f(t)dt. The Lebesgue integral
R d
c f(t)dt is equal to the Riemann integral if f is bounded
and continuous almost everywhere on [c,d]; see Theorem 1.7.1 in Ash (1972).
Random variables, denoted by X and Y deﬁned on Ω are considered together with
their corresponding probability distribution functions F and G and their corresponding
probability density functions f and g respectively. The following notations will be used
throughout this paper:
µF = µX = E(X)=
Z b
a



























n−1(y)dy n =1 ,2,3; (2)
where H = F or G. All functions are assumed to be measureable and all random variables
are assumed to satisfy:
F
A
1 (a) = 0 and F
D
1 (b)=0 . (3)
Condition (3) will hold for any random variable except a random variable with positive
probability at the points of negative inﬁnity or positive inﬁnity. We note that the deﬁnitions
of HA
n can be used to develop the stochastic dominance theory for risk averters (see for
example, Quirk and Saposnik 1962, Fishburn 1964, Hanoch and Levy 1969) while HD
n can
be used to develop the stochastic dominance theory for risk seekers (see for example, Meyer
1977, Stoyan 1983, Levy and Wiener 1998, Wong and Li 1999, and Anderson 2004). For

























i−1(t)dt, x ≥ 0 for i =2 ,3 . (4)
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i (x) x ≥ 0;
(5)
where H = F and G and i =1 ,2 and 3. HM
i will be used to develop the MSD theory while
HP
i will be used to develop the PSD theory. As MSD is easier to formulate than PSD, in
this paper we will develop the deﬁnitions and theorems for MSD ﬁrst.
Deﬁnition 1. Given two random variables X and Y with F and G as their respective
probability distribution functions, X is at least as large as Y and F is at least as large as
G in the sense of:
a. FMSD, denoted by X ￿M
1 Y or F ￿M
1 G, if and only if F M
1 (−x) ≤ GM
1 (−x) and
F M
1 (x) ≥ GM
1 (x) for each x ≥ 0;
b. SMSD, denoted by X ￿M
2 Y or F ￿M
2 G, if and only if F M
2 (−x) ≤ GM
2 (−x) and
F M
2 (x) ≥ GM
2 (x) for each x ≥ 0;
c. TMSD, denoted by X ￿M
3 Y or F ￿M
3 G, if and only if F M
3 (−x) ≤ GM
3 (−x) and
F M
3 (x) ≥ GM
3 (x) for each x ≥ 0;
where FMSD, SMSD, and TMSD stand for the ﬁrst, second and third order Markowitz
Stochastic Dominance (MSD) respectively.
If, in addition, there exists an x in [a,b] such that F M
i (x) <G M
i (x) with x<0 or
F M
i (x) >G M
i (x) with x>0 for i =1 ,2 and 3, we say that X is larger than Y and F




2 Y or F ￿M
2 G, and X ￿M
3 Y or F ￿M
3 G respectively, where SFMSD,
SSMSD, and STMSD stand for strictly ﬁrst, second and third order Markowitz Stochastic
Dominance respectively.
Deﬁnition 2. Given two random variables X and Y with F and G as their respective
probability distribution functions, X is at least as large as Y and F is at least as large as
G in the sense of:
a. FPSD, denoted by X ￿P
1 Y or F ￿P
1 G, if and only if F P
1 (−x) ≥ GP
1 (−x) and
F P
1 (x) ≤ GP
1 (x) for each x ≥ 0;
b. SPSD, denoted by X ￿P
2 Y or F ￿P
2 G, if, and only if, F P
2 (−x) ≥ GP
2 (−x) and
F P
2 (x) ≤ GP
2 (x) for each x ≥ 0;
c. TPSD, denoted by X ￿P
3 Y or F ￿P
3 G, if and only if F P
3 (−x) ≥ GP
3 (−x) and
F P
3 (x) ≤ GP
3 (x) for each x ≥ 0;
where FPSD, SPSD, and TPSD stand for the ﬁrst, second and third order Prospect Sto-
chastic Dominance (PSD) respectively.
If, in addition, there exists an x in [a,b] such that F P
i (x) >G P
i (x) with x<0 or
F P
i (x) <G P
i (x) with x>0 for i =1 ,2 and 3, we say that X is larger than Y and F




2 Y or F ￿P
2 G, and X ￿P
3 Y or F ￿P
3 G respectively, where SFPSD,
SSPSD, and STPSD stand for strictly ﬁrst, second and third order Prospect Stochastic
Dominance respectively.




a H(t)dt x < 0
R b




x H(t)dt x < 0
R x
0 H(t)dt x > 0
(6)
where H = F and G. MSD and PSD are expressed in the following deﬁnition:
9Deﬁnition 3.
a. F ￿MSD G if F M(x) ≤ GM(x) for all x; and
b. F ￿PSD G if F P(x) ≤ GP(x) for all x.
One can easily show that F ￿MSD G if and only if F ￿M
2 G and F ￿PSD G if and only if
F ￿P
2 G. Hence the MSD and PSD deﬁned in Levy and Levy are the same as the second
order MSD and PSD deﬁned in our paper. We note that Levy and Wiener (1998) and




[G(z) − F(z)]dz for all x1 ≤ 0 ≤ x2
with at least one strict inequality.
Deﬁnition 4.
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where u(i) is the ith derivative of the utility function u, u+ = u restricted for x ≥ 0
and u− = u restricted for x ≤ 0.
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10Note that in Deﬁnition 4 ‘increasing’ means ‘nondecreasing’ and ‘decreasing’ means ‘non-









1 . It is known (e.g. see Theorem 11C in Roberts and Varberg









diﬀerentiable almost everywhere and their derivatives are continuous almost everywhere.
An individual choosing between F and G in accordance with a consistent set of pref-
erences will satisfy the Von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) consistency properties. Accord-
ingly, F is (strictly) preferred to G, or equivalently, X is (strictly) preferred to Y if
∆Eu ≡ u(F) − u(G) ≡ u(X) − u(Y ) ≥ 0(> 0), (7)
where u(F) ≡ u(X) ≡
R b
a u(x)dF(x) and u(G) ≡ u(Y ) ≡
R b
a u(x)dG(x).
There is an ongoing debate in the literature regarding the shape of the utility functions.
The utility functions UA
2 and UEA
2 advocated in the literature depict the concavity of the
utility function, which is equivalent to risk aversion, according to the notion of decreasing
marginal utility. The prevalence of risk aversion is the best known generalization regarding
risky choices and was popular among the early decision theorists of the nineteenth century
(Pratt 1964, Arrow 1971).
Noticing the presence of risk seeking in preferences among positive as well as negative
prospects, Markowitz (1952) proposes a utility function which has convex and concave
regions in both the positive and the negative domains. The regions are ﬁrst concave, then
convex, then concave, and ﬁnally convex. This utility function could be used to explain the
purchasing of both insurance and lotteries observed by Friedman and Savage (1948). The
portion of this utility function that has convex and concave regions in the negative and the
positive domains respectively is equivalent to US
2 deﬁned in our paper and forms a S-shaped
utility function. Later, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
formally develop the prospect theory to link up the S-shaped utility functions. Similarly,
the portion that has concave and convex regions in the negative and the positive domains
respectively is equivalent to UR
2 deﬁned in our paper and forms a reverse S-shaped utility
function (Levy and Levy 2002).
Whitmore (1970) extends the second order SD developed by Quirk and Saposnik (1962)
11and others to the third order SD and improves the linkage of SD to the utility functions
for risk averse investors up to UA
3 . In this paper, we extend PSD and MSD developed by
Levy and Levy to the ﬁrst and third orders and improve the linkage of PSD and MSD to
the utility functions up to UES
3 and UER
3 . Details of these linkages are discussed in the
next section. One can easily show that UES
1 and UER
1 are equivalent to UEA
1 and UED
1 ; all
of these are simply sets of increasing utility functions. The set UES
2 containing S-shaped
utility functions, with concave and convex regions in the positive and the negative domains
respectively, and the set UER
n containing reverse S-shaped utility functions, with convex and
concave regions in the positive and the negative domains respectively, have been discussed
in detail in the literature, for example, see Markowitz (1952), Levy and Wiener (1998)
and Levy and Levy (2002, 2004). A utility in UES
3 is increasing with its marginal utility
decreasing in the positive domain but increasing in the negative domain, and is graphically
convex in both the positive and negative domains. On the other hand, a utility in UER
3
is increasing with its marginal utility increasing in the positive domain but decreasing in
the negative domain, and is graphically convex in both the positive and negative domains.
In order to draw a clearer picture for both the second and third orders SD, we deﬁne the








where u(i) is the ith derivative of the utility function u.
With the deﬁnition of risk aversion, one can easily show the relationship between risk
aversion and the sets of utility functions deﬁned in Deﬁnition 4. For example, if u ∈ US
2 ,
then its risk aversion will be positive in the positive domain and negative in the negative
domain. Similarly, if u ∈ UR
2 , then its risk aversion will be negative in the position domain
and positive in the negative domain. In addition, if the risk aversion is positively decreasing
in the positive domain and negatively decreasing in the negative domain, then the utility
function belongs to u ∈ US
3 . On the other hand, if the risk aversion is negatively decreasing
in the positive domain but positively decreasing in the negative domain, then the utility
function belongs to u ∈ UR
3 . Investors with utility u is well-known to have Decreasing
Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA) behavior if u(1) > 0, u(2) < 0 and u(3) > 0, see for
example, Falk and Levy (1989). We can say that investors with utility functions u ∈ US
3
12have DARA behavior in the positive domain and investors with utility functions u ∈ UR
3
have DARA behavior in the negative domain.
Let us turn to the empirical evidence on the S-shaped or reverse S-shaped utility func-
tions. It is well-known that under the expected utility theory, convexity of utility is equiva-
lent to risk seeking while concavity is equivalent to risk aversion. Empirical measurements
generally corroborate with the concavity in the utility for gains, for example, see Fish-
burn and Kochenberger (1979), Fennema and van Assen (1999) and Abdellaoui (2000).
However, the behavior of gamblers reveals convexity for gains (Friedman and Savage 1948;
Markowitz 1952). For the utility for losses, some studies ﬁnd convexity while some ﬁnd
concavity. For example, Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979), Pennings and Smidts (2003),
ﬁnd convex utility for losses for the majority of cases and concave utility for losses for
a sizeable minority of subjects. Despite the studies of Laughhunn et al. (1980), Currim
and Sarin (1989), Myagkov and Plott (1997), Heath et al. (1999), no conclusive evidence
in favor of convex utility for losses is provided, which would have supported the reverse
S-shaped utility functions.
Finally, we note that in the prospect theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the S-shaped utility function is called the
value function as it is attuned to the evaluation of changes or diﬀerences of wealth rather
than the evaluation of absolute magnitudes. In this paper, we simply call it utility function
as we do not restrict its applications to total wealth or the changes or diﬀerences of wealth.
We also note that Levy and Wiener (1998) deﬁne Up and Levy and Levy (2002) deﬁne
VKT as the class of all prospect theory value S-shaped functions with an inﬂection point
at x = 0 where the subscripts KT denote Kahneman and Tversky. This is the same as our
US
2 . They also deﬁne VM as the class of all Markowitz utility functions which are reverse
S-shaped, with an inﬂection point at x = 0, where the subscript M denotes Markowitz.
This is the same as our UR
2 .
133 Theory
In this section we develop the basic theorems and some basic properties for MSD and PSD.
We ﬁrst introduce the basic theorem linking the MSD of the ﬁrst three orders to investors
with reverse S-shaped utility functions to the ﬁrst three orders:
Theorem 1. Let X and Y be random variables with probability distribution functions
F and G respectively. Suppose u is a utility function. For i =1 ,2 and 3, we have
F ￿M
i (￿M
i )G if and only if u(F) ≥ (>)u(G) for any u in UER
i (UESR
i ).




i . We next introduce the theorem linking PSD
to investors with S-shaped utility functions to the ﬁrst three orders:
Theorem 2. Let X and Y be random variables with probability distribution functions
F and G respectively. Suppose u is a utility function. For i =1 ,2 and 3, we have
F ￿P
i (￿P
i )G if and only if u(F) ≥ (>)u(G) for any u in UES
i (UESS
i ).





The SD results for risk averters and risk seekers similar to the above two theorems have
been well explored. Linking the SD theory to risk averters, there are Hadar and Russell
(1971) and Bawa (1975) who prove that the stochastic dominance results for continuous
density functions are linked with continuously diﬀerentiable utility functions; Hanoch and
Levy (1969) and Tesfatsion (1976) who prove the validity of the ﬁrst and second order sto-
chastic dominance for general distribution functions; and Whitmore (1970) who extends
their results and shows that the third order stochastic dominance for risk averters holds
true. Broadening the scope, Meyer (1977) discusses the validity of the second order sto-
chastic dominance for risk seekers and risk averters while Stoyan (1983) proves that the
ﬁrst and second order stochastic dominance results are applicable to risk seekers as well as
risk averters, and Li and Wong (1999) obtain results for the ﬁrst three orders stochastic
dominance for risk seekers as well as risk averters. Furthermore, Levy and Levy (2002) de-
velop the second order PSD and MSD theories and link them to the second order S-shaped
and reverse S-shaped utility functions. We extend their work and link PSD and MSD of
14any order to the S-shaped and reverse S-shaped utility functions as shown in the above
two theorems.
Many studies claim that prospect theory violates the expected utility theory as the
convexity of the value function is diﬀerent in the positive domain from that in the negative
domain. Levy and Levy (2002) prove that the prospect theory does not violate the expected
utility theory as both the second order MSD and PSD satisfy the expected utility paradigm.
In this paper, we extend Levy and Levy’s results to examine the compatibility of the MSD
and PSD of any order with the expected utility theory and prove that the MSD and PSD
of any order are consistent with the expected utility paradigm as shown in the above two
theorems.
Whitmore (1970) extends the second order SD to the third order SD for risk averters
and thereafter many academics demonstrate the usefulness of the third order SD, see
for example, Gotoh and Hiroshi (2000) and Ng (2000). In addition, Hammond (1974)
generlizes the SD theory to the n-order for any integer n. Both the MSD and PSD theories
can be extended to any order in similar ways. However, we focus our discussion up to the
ﬁrst three orders in this paper as the ﬁrst three orders SD are of most importance in theory
as well as empirical applications.
It is well-known that hierarchy exists in SD relationships for risk averters and risk
seekers: the ﬁrst order SD implies the second order SD which in turn implies the third
order SD in the SD rules for risk averters as well as risk seekers (Falk and Levy 1989;
Li and Wong 1999). Thus, the following hierarchical relationships for MSP and PSD are
obtained:
Corollary 1. For any random variables X and Y , for i =1and 2, we have the
following:
a. if X ￿M
i (￿M
i )Y , then X ￿M
i+1 (￿M
i+1)Y ; and
b. if X ￿P
i (￿P
i )Y , then X ￿P
i+1 (￿P
i+1)Y .
The results of this corollary suggest that practitioners report the MSD and PSD results to
the lowest order in empirical analyses. Levy and Levy (2002) show that it is possible for
MSD to be ‘the opposite’ of PSD in their second orders and that F dominates G in SPSD,
15but G dominates F in SMSD. In the following corollary, we extend their result to include
MSD and PSD to the second and third orders:
Corollary 2. For any random variables X and Y ,i fF and G have the same mean










2 )F ;and (9)
b. if, in addition, either F ￿M
2 (￿M
2 )G or G ￿P
2 (￿P










There are cases when distributions F and G have the same mean and do not satisfy (9)
yet satisfying (10) as shown in the following example:
Example 1: Consider the distribution functions
F(t)=

          
          
0 −1 ≤ t ≤− 7/8,
1/6 −7/8 ≤ t ≤− 3/4,
2(t +1 ) /3 −3/4 ≤ t ≤− 1/2,
1/3 −1/2 ≤ t ≤− 1/4,
1/2 −1/4 ≤ t ≤ 0,




       
       
2(t +1 ) /3 −1 ≤ t ≤− 3/4,
1/6 −3/4 ≤ t ≤− 5/8,
1/3 −5/8 ≤ t ≤− 1/2,
1/2+t/3 −1/2 ≤ t ≤ 0,
1 − F(−t)0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
In Figure 1, we draw the distribution functions and their diﬀerence. Notice that both
distributions have the same zero mean and same variance. In Figure 2, we draw F M
2 and
GM
2 and their diﬀerence. We see that the diﬀerence has both positive and negative values
at [−1,0] and [0,1]. Hence there is no SMSD dominance. In Figure 3, we draw F P
2 and
16GP
2 and their diﬀerence. Again there is no SPSD dominance. In Figure 4, we draw F M
3
and GM
3 and their diﬀerence. We see that for x ≤ 0, the diﬀerence is nonnegative, and for
x ≥ 0, the diﬀerence is nonpositive. This means that F ￿M
3 G. In Figure 5, we draw F P
3
and GP
3 and their diﬀerence. We see that for x ≤ 0, the diﬀerence is nonnegative, and for
x ≥ 0, the diﬀerence is nonpositive. This means that G ￿P
3 F.
The above corollary provides the conditions in which F is ‘the opposite’ of G and the
above example shows that there exist pairs of distributions which are ‘opposites’ in the
third order but not in the second order. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that under some
regularities, F becomes ‘the same’ as G in the sense of TMSD and TPSD as shown in the
corollary below:
Corollary 3. If F and G satisfy
F
A

























One should note that the assumptions in (11) are very restrictive. In fact, if some of the
assumptions are not satisﬁed, there exists F and G such that G ￿P
3 F but neither F ￿M
3 G
nor G ￿M




    
    
4(t +1 ) /5 −1 ≤ t ≤− 3/4,
2t/5+1 /2 −3/4 ≤ t ≤− 1/4,
(4t +3 ) /5 −1/4 ≤ t ≤ 0,






0 −1 ≤ t ≤− 3/4,
2/5 −3/4 ≤ t ≤ 0,
1 − F(−t)0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
17In Figure 6, we draw the functions and their diﬀerence. Notice that both distributions
have the same zero mean and same variance. In Figure 7, we draw F M
3 and GM
3 and their
diﬀerence. We see that the diﬀerence has both positive and negative values at [−1,0] and
[0,1]. This means that we do not have F ￿M
3 G or G ￿M
3 F. In Figure 8, we draw F P
3
and GP
3 and their diﬀerence. We see that for x ≤ 0, the diﬀerence is nonnegative, and for
x ≥ 0, the diﬀerence is nonpositive. This means that G ￿P
3 F.
The above corollary and example show that under some regularities, F is ‘the same’
as G in the sense of TMSD and TPSD. One may wonder whether this ‘same direction
property’ could appear in FMSD vs FPSD and SMSD vs SPSD. In the following corollary,
we show that this is possible.
Corollary 4.
If the random variable X = p+qY and if p+qx ≥ (>)x for all x ∈ [a,b], then we have
X ￿M
i (￿M
i )Y and X ￿P
i (￿P
i )Y for i =1 , 2 and 3.
As shown by Levy and Levy (2002), MSD is generally not ‘the opposite’ of PSD. In
other words, if F dominates G in PSD, it does not necessarily mean that G dominates
F in MSD. This is easy to see because having a higher mean is a necessary condition for
dominance by both rules. Therefore, if F dominates G in PSD, and F has a higher mean
than G, G cannot possibly dominate F in MSD. The above corollary goes one step further
and shows that they could be ‘the same’ in the sense of MSD and PSD. In addition, we
derive the following corollary to show the relationship between the ﬁrst order MSD and
PSD.










In addition, one can easily show that X stochastically dominates Y in the sense of FMSD
or FPSD if and only if X stochastically dominates Y in the sense of the ﬁrst order SD
(FSD). Incorporating this into the Arbitrage versus SD theorem in Jarrow (1986) will yield
the following corollary:
18Corollary 6. If the market is complete, then for any random variables X and Y ,
X ￿M
1 Y or if X ￿P
1 Y if and only if there is an arbitrage opportunity between X and Y
such that one will increase one’s wealth as well as one’s utility if one shifts the investments
from Y to X.
Jarrow (1986) deﬁnes a ‘complete’ market as ‘an economy where all contingent claims
on the primary assets trade.’ The Arbitrage versus SD theorem in Jarrow (1986) says that
if the market is complete, then X stochastically dominates Y in the sense of FSD if and
only if there is an arbitrage opportunity between X and Y .A s X ￿M
1 Y is equivalent
to X ￿P
1 Y (see Corollary 5), both are equivalent to X stochastically dominates Y in
the sense of FSD. Corollary 6 holds when the Arbitrage versus SD theorem in Jarrow is
applied.
The safety-ﬁrst rule is ﬁrst introduced by Roy (1952) for decision making under un-
certainty. It stipulates choosing an alternative that provides a target mean return while
minimizing the probability of the return falling below some threshold of disaster. Bawa
(1978) takes the idea and examines the relationships between the SD and generalized safety-
ﬁrst rules for arbitrage distributions. Jarrow (1986) ﬁrst studies the relationship between
SD and arbitrage pricing and discovers the existence of the arbitrage opportunities in the
SD rules. In this paper, we extend Jarrow’s work on arbitrage pricing to both MSD and
PSD.
It is easy to show that X stochastically dominates Y in the sense of FMSD or FPSD if
and only if X stochastically dominates Y in the sense of the ﬁrst order stochastic dominance
(FSD). As demonstrated by Bawa (1978) and Jarrow (1986), if X dominates Y in the sense
of FSD, there is an arbitrage opportunity, and one can increase one’s wealth as well as one’s
utility if one shifts the investment from Y to X. Hence, the results of Corollary 6 hold.
Using the results in Theorems 1 and 2, we can call a person a ﬁrst-order-MSD (FMSD)
investor if his/her utility function u belongs to UR
1 , and a ﬁrst-order-PSD (FPSD) investor
if his/her utility function U belongs to US
1 . A second-order-MSD (SMSD) risk investor, a
second-order-PSD (SPSD) risk investor, a third-order-MSD (TMSD) risk investor and a
third-order-PSD (TPSD) risk investor can be deﬁned in the same way. From Deﬁnition
4 and the deﬁnition of risk aversion deﬁned in (8), one can tell that the risk aversion of
a SPSD investor is positive in the positive domain and negative in the negative domain
19and a SMSD investor’s risk aversion is negative in the positive domain and positive in the
negative domain. If one’s risk aversion is positive and decreasing in the positive domain
and negative and decreasing in the negative domain, then one is a TPSD investor; but
the reverse is not true. Similarly, if one’s risk aversion is negative and decreasing in the
positive domain and positive and decreasing in the negative domain, then one is a TMSD
investor. We summarize these results in the following corollary:
Corollary 7. For an investor with an increasing utility function u and risk aversion
r,
a. s/he is a SPSD investor if and only if her/his risk aversion r is positive in the positive
domain and negative in the negative domain;
b. s/he is a SMSD investor if and only if her/his risk aversion r is negative in the
positive domain and positive in the negative domain;
c. if her/his risk aversion r is always decreasing and is positive in the positive domain
and negative in the negative domain, then s/he is a TPSD investor; and
d. if her/his risk aversion r is always decreasing and is negative in the positive domain
and positive in the negative domain, then s/he is a TMSD investor.
Corollary 7 states the relationships between diﬀerent types of investors and their risk
aversions. We note that the converse of (c) and (d) are not true.
4 Illustration
In this section we illustrate each case of MSD and PSD to the ﬁrst three orders by using
examples from Levy and Levy (2002) and modifying them. We ﬁrst use Task III of Ex-
periment 3 in Levy and Levy (2002) which is a replication of the tasks in Kahneman and
Tversky (1979). In the experiment, $10,000 is invested in either stock F or Stock G with
the following dollar gain one month later and with probabilities f and g respectively, as
shown in Table 1.
20Table 1 : The distributions for Investments F and G
Investment F Investment G









We use the MSD and PSD integrals HM
i and HP
i for H = F and G and i =1 ,2a n d3














for i =1 ,2 and 3 and present the results of the MSD and PSD integrals with their
diﬀerentials for the ﬁrst three orders in the following two tables:
Table 2 : The MSD Intergrals and their diﬀerentials for F and G











-3 0 0.25 0.25 00 0 00 0
-1.5 0.5 0.25 -0.25 0 0.375 0.375 0 0.28125 0.28125
0− 0.5 0.25 -0.25 0.75 0.75 0 0.5625 1.125 0.5625
0+ 0.5 0.75 0.25 2.25 2.25 0 5.0625 3.375 -1.6875
3 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.75 0 -0.75 0.5625 0 -0.5625
4.5 0.5 0 -0.5 00 0 00 0
Table 3 : The PSD Intergrals and their diﬀerentials for F and G











-3 11 0 2.25 2.25 0 2.8125 3.375 0.5625
-1.5 1 0.75 -0.25 0.75 1.125 0.375 0.5625 0.84375 0.28125
0− 0.5 0.75 0.25 00 0 00 0
0+ 0.5 0.25 -0.25 00 0 00 0
3 0.5 1 0.5 1.5 0.75 -0.75 2.25 1.125 -1.125
4.5 11 0 2.25 2.25 0 5.0625 3.375 -1.6875
In this example, Levy and Levy conclude that F ￿MSD G but G ￿PSD F while our
results show that F ￿M
i G and G ￿P
i F for i = 2 and 3. From Corollary 1, we know that
21hierarchy exists in both MSD and PSD such that F ￿M
2 G implies F ￿M
3 G while G ￿P
2 F
implies G ￿P
3 F. Hence, one only has to report the lowest SD order. Our ﬁndings shows
that F ￿M
2 G and G ￿P
2 F, same as the ﬁndings in Levy and Levy. Our approach has no
advantage over Levy and Levy’s in this example. Nevertheless, Levy and Levy’s approach
can only detect the second order MSD and PSD while our approach enables investors to
compare MSD and PSD to any order. In order to show the superiority of our approach,
we modify the above experiment by adjusting the probabilities f and g for investments F
and G respectively. Reported in the tables below are all other orders of both MSD and
PSD. For simplicity, we only report the diﬀerentials GF M
i and GF P
i and skip reporting
their integrals. For easy comparison, we also report the MSD and PSD computation based








Note that Levy and Levy deﬁne F ￿MSD G if GF M(x) ≥ 0 for all x and F ￿PSD G if
GF P(x) ≥ 0 for all x with some strict inequality.
Table 4 : The MSP and PSD diﬀerentials for F and G : Case 2
Gain probability MSD PSD Levy and Levy






3 GF M GF P
-3 0 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 -0.45 -0.45 0 0.45
-1.5 0.2 0 0.05 0.375 0.28125 -0.25 -0.075 -0.05625 0.375 0.075
0− 000.05 0.45 0.9 -0.05 0 0 0.45 0
0+ 00 -0.05 -1.35 -4.785 0.05 0 0 1.35 0
3 0 0.75 -0.05 -1.2 -0.9 0.8 0.15 0.225 1.2 0.15
4.5 0.8 0 -0.8 0 0 0 1.35 1.35 0 1.35
22Table 5 : The MSP and PSD diﬀerentials for F and G : Case 3
Gain probability MSD PSD Levy and Levy






3 GF M GF P
-3 0 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0.075 0.73125 0 -0.075
-1.5 0.55 0 -0.3 0.375 0.28125 -0.25 0.45 0.3375 0.375 -0.45
0− 00 -0.3 -0.075 0.50625 0.3 0 0 -0.075 0
0+ 000.3 0.225 -1.18125 -0.3 0 0 -0.225 0
3 0 0.75 0.3 -0.675 -0.50625 0.45 -0.9 -1.35 0.675 -0.9
4.5 0.45 0 -0.45 0 0 0 -0.225 -2.19375 0 -0.225
Table 6 : The MSP and PSD diﬀerentials for F and G : Case 4
Gain probability MSD PSD Levy and Levy






3 GF M GF P
-3 0 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 -0.15 0.225 0 0.15
-1.5 0.4 0 -0.15 0.375 0.28125 -0.25 0.225 0.16875 0.375 -0.225
0− 00 -0.15 0.15 0.625 0.15 0 0 0.15 0
0+ 000.15 -0.45 -2.7 -0.15 0 0 0.45 0
3 0 0.75 0.15 -0.9 -0.625 0.6 -0.45 -0.675 0.9 -0.45
4.5 0.6 0 -0.6 0 0 0 0.45 -0.675 0 0.45
In Table 4, if one adopts Levy and Levy’s approach, one will conclude that F ￿MSD G
and F ￿PSD G. However, if one applies our approach, one will conclude that F ￿M
1 G and
F ￿P
1 G, which is diﬀerent from the conclusion drawn from Levy and Levy’s approach.
From Corollary 1, we know that hierarchy exists in both MSD and PSD such that F ￿M
1 G
implies F ￿M
2 G while G ￿P
1 F implies G ￿P
2 F. Hence, one only has to report the lowest
SD order. However, reporting the ﬁrst order MSD and PSD obtained by using our approach
should be more appropriate.
In Table 5, if one uses Levy and Levy’s approach, one will conclude that neither F ￿MSD
G nor F ￿MSD G, instead G ￿PSD F. However, if one applies our approach, one will
conclude that G ￿P
2 F but F ￿M
3 G, which is diﬀerent from the conclusion drawn from
Levy and Levy’s approach. Similarly, in Table 6, if one uses Levy and Levy’s approach,
one will conclude that neither F ￿PSD G nor F ￿PSD G, instead G ￿MSD F. However, if
one applies our approach, one will conclude that F ￿M
2 G but G ￿P
3 F, which is diﬀerent
23from the conclusion drawn from Levy and Levy’s approach. Our approach reveals more
information on both MSD and PSD.
The results from our illustrations are more informative for investors than Levy and
Levy’s because we identify the MSD and PSD prospects for the ﬁrst three orders while Levy
and Levy only identify MSD and PSD for the second order, which may not truly present
the MSD and PSD nature of these prospects. As our approach can provide investors with
more information about investments opportunities, our approach could enable investors
to make wiser decisions on investments. For example, in Table 4, using Levy and Levy’s
approach, SMSD and SPSD (also TMSD and TPSD) investors will choose to invest on
F rather than G and will increase their utilities but not their wealth when shifting their
investments from G to F. For FMSD and FPSD investors, they will not be able to obtain
any useful information at all. However, if investors adopt our approach, it will be a
completely diﬀerent story. FMSD, SMSD, TMSD, FPSD, SPSD and TPSD investors will
choose to invest on F rather than G and all of them will increase their utilities as well
as their wealth when shifting their investments from G to F. What’s more, our approach
enables investors to identify that there is an arbitrage opportunity between F and G and
one could long F and short G with the same amount of money, holding a zero dollar
portfolio and making huge proﬁt.
Furthermore, Levy and Levy’s approach will not be able to reveal any TMSD or TPSD
prospect, while ours will enable investors to identify them, which in turn provides useful
information for the TMSD and TPSD investors. If the approach by Levy and Levy is
applied, one will conclude neither MSD nor PSD. For the TMSD and TPSD investors,
they will not know about the relationships between these prospects and will miss these
investment opportunities. For example, referring to Table 5, TMSD investors will not be
able to decide which prospect to invest if they apply Levy and Levy’s approach. However,
if they apply our approach, they will invest in F rather than G and if they have invested
in G, our approach will tell them that they will increase their utilities if they shift their
investments from G to F. Similar conclusion can be made by TPSD investors about the
investment choices presented in Table 6. We note that SD for both risk averters and risk
seekers can be extended to any order. Our approach can also be easily extended to any
order. Hence if investors need to identify any prospect of MSP or PSD of an order higher
than three, they could easily extend our theory to meet their needs.
245 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we ﬁrst develop the MSD and PSD to the ﬁrst three orders and link them to
the corresponding S-shaped and reverse S-shaped utility functions to the ﬁrst three orders.
We then provide experiments to illustrate each case of the MSD and PSD to the ﬁrst three
orders and demonstrate that the higher order of MSD and PSD cannot be replaced by
the lower order MSD and PSD. In addition, we develop some properties for the extended
MSD and PSD including the hierarchy that exists in both PSD and MSD relationships;
arbitrage opportunity that exists for the ﬁrst orders of both PSD and MSD; and for any
two prospects satisfying certain conditions, their third order of MSD preference will be
‘the opposite’ of or ‘the same’ as their third order counterpart PSD preference.
Prospect theory is a paradigm challenging the expected utility theory. The main con-
troversy is the prospect theory’s S-shaped value function which describes preferences. This
has been discussed in our paper in detail and our conclusion is that it does not violate
the expected utility theory. By adopting our approach, theoreticians as well as practi-
tioners will come to the same conclusion. The next allegation is that the prospect theory
invalidates the expected utility theory as being subjectively distort probabilities. To prove
otherwise, Levy and Wiener (1998) recommend employing the subjective weighting func-
tions. We would suggest applying the Bayesian approach (Matsumura, et al 1990) and then
use the advanced statistical techniques (see for example, Wong and Miller 1990; Tiku et
al 2000; Wong and Bian 2005) to estimate the subjectively distort probabilities. Prospect
theory will satisfy the Bayesian expected utility maximization. Thus, the claim that the
prospect theory violates the expected utility theory is invalid.
The advantage of the stochastic dominance approach is that we have a decision rule
which holds for all utility functions of certain class. Speciﬁcally, PSD (MSD) of any order
is a criterion which is valid for all S-shaped (reverse S-shaped) utility functions of the
corresponding order. Moreover, the SD rules for S-shaped and reverse S-shaped utility
functions can be employed with mixed prospects.
These days, it is popular to apply SD to explain ﬁnancial theories and anomalies, for
example, McNamara (1998), Post and Levy (2002), Post (2003), Kuosmanen (2004) and
Fong et al. (2005). Some apply the Levy and Levy approach to study risk averse and
25risk seeking behaviors. For example, Post and Levy (2002) study risk seeking behaviors in
order to explain the cross-sectional pattern of stock returns and suggest that the reverse
S-shaped utility functions can explain stock returns, with risk aversion for losses and risk
seeking for gains reﬂecting investors’ twin desire for downside protection in bear markets
and upside potential in bull markets. Using the second order PSD and MSD introduced
by Levy and Levy is too restrictive. We recommend that ﬁnancial analysts and investors
apply the approach introduced in this paper and examine the MSD and PSD relationships
of diﬀerent orders so that they can make wiser decisions about their investments.
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Figure 6: F and G and their diﬀerence








FM3: red−dot, GM3: blue−dash












Figure 7: F M
3 and GM
3 and their diﬀerence









FP3: red−dot, GP3: blue−dash









Figure 8: F P
3 and GP
3 and their diﬀerence
36